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POINT I
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued:

POINT III
WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT AND, PERHAPS, WITHOUT KNOWING IT,
THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED A POSITION CONTRARY TO ITS PRIOR
DECISIONS INVOLVING SIMILAR STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

POINT IV
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS CLEAR, FROM THE LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTES THEMSELVES, THAT THE RENEWAL STATUTE DOES NOT
APPLY TO THE TRUST DEED STATUTE.

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§57-1-32

Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to recover
balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was given
as security.

At any time within three months after any sale bf property under a trust
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as
security, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of
the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for
which such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date
of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value
at the date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment
for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In
any action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action
under this section.
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED - Continued:
§78-12-1

Time for commencement of actions generally.

Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in
this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases
where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
78-12-26

Within three years.

Within three years:
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except
that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or
trespass.
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including
actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock" which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the
animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's fault,
the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of such
facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the
animal by the defendant.
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the
cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than
for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in
special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
(5) an action to enforce liability imposed by §78-17-3, except that the
cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or
reasonably should know of the harm suffered.
78-12-28

Within two years.

Within two years, an action:
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer upon a liability
incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue of his
-vi-
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office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of
money collected upon an execution; but this section does not apply to an
action for an escape;
(2) for recovery damages for the death of one caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another; or
(3) for injury to the personal rights of another as a civil rights suit under 42
U.S.C. 1983.
§78-12-29 Within one year.
Within one year:
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state.
(2) an action upon a statute or a penalty or forfeiture where the action is
given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the
statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action,
for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or
seduction.
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner
arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process.
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to
property caused by a mob or riot.
§78-12-35 Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the
state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this
chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action.
§78-12-36 Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
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majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.
§78-12-37 Effect of death.
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the
time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action
survives, an action may be commenced by his representatives after the
expiration of that time and within one year from his death. If a person
against whom an action may be brought dies before the expiration of the
time limited for the commencement thereof and the cause of action survives,
an action may be commenced against the representatives after the
expiration of that time and within one year after the issue of letters
testamentary or of administration.
§78-12-38 Effect of death of defendant outside this state.
If a person against whom a cause of action exists dies without the state,
the time which elapses between his death and the expiration of one year
after the issuing, within this state, of letters testamentary or letters of
administration is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of an
action therefor against his executor or administrator.
§78-12-39 Effect of war.
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a country at war with the
United States, the time of the continuance of the war is not a part of the
period limited for the commencement of the action.
§78-12-40 Effect of a failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for
the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause
of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law
or contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
-viii-
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§78-12-41 Effect of injunction or prohibition.
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a
statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Attorneys for Appellants
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 531-8300
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STANDARD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a federally
chartered savings and loan,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 900017

vs.
THOMAS K. KIRKBRIDE and
RUFE SOULE, both individuals,
Defendants-Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellants respectfully petition the Court for a rehearing in this matter
on the grounds that the decision filed May 17, 1991 appears to be based upon an
incorrect assumption as to essential facts and the decision, without acknowledging it,
adopts a legal position which is contrary to this Court's prior decisions and contrary
to the overwhelming majority position taken by the highest courts of other states. It
also does not consider the plain meaning of the statutes of limitations.
1

POINT I
KIRKBRIDE AND SOULE WERE NOT PUT ON
NOTICE WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE SALE THAT
A DEFICIENCY WOULD BE SOUGHT.
The Court's opinion, on page 3, states that, in the absence of legislative
history, the Court may refer to four sources. Two of those sources are the "apparent
purposes" of the statutes and the "practical consequences" of the position taken. On
page 4 of the court's opinion, it is stated with respect to §57-1-32, Utah Code
Annotated, that
. . . its primary purpose is satisfied when the foreclosing party
provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be sought
by filing the action. . . .
Prior to the enactment of specific trust deed foreclosure
statutes, the general rule was that after foreclosing on the
property securing the note, the mortgagor (sic) [mortgagee]
could wait the period of the statute of limitations to give a
debtor notice that it would seek a deficiency judgment. . . .
This delay could leave the debtor in a state of financial
uncertainty for years. Under trust deed statutes such as
section 57-1-32, the creditor is given a speedy remedy of
foreclosure and sale, but in exchange, it must promptly put
the debtor on notice as to whether it will seek any balance
due by commencing an action. Once this notice is given or
the three-month time period runs, the debtor can plan
accordingly.
In the present case, Kirkbride and Soule were put on
notice within three months of the date of the sale of the
collateral that a deficiency would be sought.
While this appears to be a correct statement of the law, it incorrectly states the facts
of this case. Kirkbnde and Soule were not put on notice within three months of
March 11, 1987, the date of the sale. Yes, a complaint was filed in the clerk's office
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three days short of the end of the three-month period, on June 8, 1987, but no
summons was issued until February 8, 1988, and the summons and complaint were
not served on either defendant until March 5,1988. Thus, neither defendant had any
idea that Standard intended to seek a deficiency judgment until six days short of one
year following the trustee's sale. If the purpose of §57-1-32 is to require the
mortgagee to "promptly put the debtor on notice as to whether it will seek any
balance due . . . " so that "the debtor can plan accordingly", that purpose was not
accomplished in this case. The filing of a complaint is an ex parte act that does not
give notice to anybody. Only the service of the summons provides the proper notice.
That is why the prior version of Rule 4(b), U.R.C.P., required a summons to be
issued within three months of thefilingof the complaint and why the present Rule
4(b) requires the summons to be served within 120 days of the filing of the complaint.
But that is not the end of the story. After the first complaint was
dismissed, on May 2,1988, for failure to issue the summons within the time required
by the rule, Standard waited until March 13, 1989, more than ten months after the
dismissal and more than two years after the trustee's sale, tofileits second complaint.
The summons was not issued until May 17, 1989 and was not served until July 18,
1989. Thus, Kirkbride and Soule were not given prompt notice the second time
around either and their "state offinancialuncertainty" continued for two years and
four months. The purpose of the statute was twice frustrated in this case all because
of the lack of diligence on Standard's part.
If the purpose of the statute is to provide notice to the debtor within
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three months (or within 120 days thereafter, to allow time for service under Rule
4(b)), it does not make sense to extend that time by the one year provided in §78-1240, U.C.A. Had the legislature intended a renewal statute to apply to the threemonth right under the deficiency statute, it would have enacted a three-month
renewal statute to preserve the purpose of providing immediate notice of intent to
seek a deficiency. Otherwise, the state of financial uncertainty can be extended far
beyond what the legislature intended. The delays in this case, whether intentional or
inadvertent, demonstrate as well as any case could, how the legislative purpose is
frustrated by application of the renewal statute to the deficiency statute. If, in the
absence of legislative history explaining the intended interaction of the two statutes,
the practical consequences are to be considered, as stated on page 3 of the Court's
opinion, then it must be concluded that the renewal statute was not intended to apply
to the deficiency statute. The practical consequence of keeping Kirkbride and Soule
in a state of financial uncertainty for more than two years is contrary to the purpose
of providing notice to them within three months of the trustee's sale so they can plan
accordingly.

POINT n
WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT AND, PERHAPS,
WITHOUT KNOWING IT, THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED
THE MINORITY VIEW WITH RESPECT TO STATUTES
OF THIS KIND.
Appellants have asserted that statutes which create causes of action and
contain specific limitation periods for those causes of action are not affected by the
4

general renewal statute. The Court found this argument unpersuasive but, in doing
so, has ruled contrary to the overwhelming majority of courts in this country. Since
the Court did not address the decisions of other courts with respect to this question,
it is assumed it did not know it was adopting a minority position. The majority view
is that statutes, like the trust deed statute, which contain their own time limitations,
are not affected by renewal statutes. These self-contained time requirements are not
considered to be statutes of limitations but rather conditions precedent to the
bringing of the action itself. This position is stated in 51 AM. JUR. 2d, Limitation of
Actions, §309, as follows:
§309. Application to statutory causes of action.
Generally speaking, statutes permitting a new action to
be brought after the expiration of the period of limitations,
upon the failure of a previous action commenced within that
period, have been regarded as applying to actions founded
upon nonstatutory rights or upon rights formerly existing
independently of statute. Moreover, where a statute creates
a right of action which did not exist at common law, and
which does not obtain in the absence of such statute, the
limitation prescribed therein, within which such action must
be commenced, is a condition imposed upon the exercise of
the right of action granted, and this time is not extended by
the pendency and dismissal of a former action. This is
because the time limit described in such statute is ordinarily
regarded as a limitation upon the right itself, so that when the
time expires, the right is extinguished except as to actions
then pending.
Thus, renewal statutes have been held not applicable to actions to contest an election
governed by an internal 20-day limitation, Casey v. Burdine, 214 Ark. 680, 217 S.W.2d
613 (1949); to a summary proceeding to foreclose a lien on a sawmill, Walker v.
Burt, 57 Ga. 20 (1876); to a statutory right of foreclosure on a materialmen's lien
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with an internal limitation, Chamlee Lumber Co. v. Crichton. 136 Ga. 391, 71 S.E.
673 (1911); to a statutory action to revive a judgment governed by an internal
limitation, Berkley v. Tootle. 62 Kan. 701, 64 Pac. 620 (1901); to a statutory action
contesting the validity of a will governed by an internal limitation, Re Estate of
Speake, 743 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1987); Alakiotis v. Lancione. 12 Ohio Misc. 257, 41
Ohio Ops.2d 381, 232 NE.2d 663 (1966); Peacock v. Churchill 38 Dl. App. 634, 120
ALR 381 (1890); to an action for reinstatement of a police officer, King v. Butte, 71
Mont. 309, 230 Pac. 62 (1924); to the 90-day period for bringing an action on a claim
rejected by an administrator, Poole v. Rutherford. 199 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947); to the 20-day period allowed for contesting a workman's compensation award
(even though the renewal statute only allowed 60 days to refile), Leadon v. Truck Ins.
Exchange, 253 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); to a statutory trespass action with
its own time limitation, Evans v. Broadhead, 233 So.2d 771 (Miss. 1970); and to
wrongful death statutes containing their own limitation periods, Rodman v. Missouri
Pac, R.R. Co., 65 Kan. 645, 70 Pac. 642 (1902); Perry v. Staver. 81 N.M. 766, 473
P.2d 380 (1970). For a review of these and many other cases with similar holdings,
see Annotation, 79 ALR 2d 1309 (1961), especially §5 at pp. 1323-26.
No cases have been located in any jurisdiction in which the application
of the renewal statute to a trust deed statute has been considered. But the Utah
Trust Deed Statute is clearly one of the class of statutes considered in each of the
abo/e cases which contains its own time limitation. See McCarthy v. Lewis, 615 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1980), at 1259, ftn. 4, in which this Court stated that the three-month
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time period for reinstatement under the trust deed statute is not a statute of
limitations. The same reasoning applies also to the three-month time period for
bringing a deficiency action in the same statute. Thus, if the decision in this case
stands, Utah will be listed in the next annotation among the minority jurisdictions,
which are referred to in the annotation as "doubtful jurisdictions." Annotation, 79
ALR 2d 1309 (1961), §6 at p.1327. If this Court intends to be one of the few states
adopting that minority and "doubtful" position, it ought to do so knowingly and after
having considered and distinguished the majority

cases holding otherwise.

Appellants believe this ground alone justifies a rehearing of this matter to consider
and, perhaps, allow further briefing with respect to the position taken by other
jurisdictions.

POINT III
WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT AND, PERHAPS,
WITHOUT KNOWING IT, THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED
A POSITION CONTRARY TO ITS PRIOR DECISIONS
INVOLVING SIMILAR STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
On page 3 of its opinion the Court stated that, in the absence of
legislative history explaining the intended interaction of the trust deed and renewal
statutes, it could refer "to our own decisions in somewhat analogous cases". There
are several such decisions to which the Court has not referred and which ought to be
considered before the decision in this case becomes final. Those decisions involve
statutory provisions similar to §57-1-32 and, in those decisions, the Court has taken
the majority position. The decision in this case, therefore, represents a serious
7

change of course which may affect future decisions involving those other statutes.
Again, if such a change of course was intended, it should be made knowingly and only
after having considered and distinguished this Court's prior decisions.
One such case is State v. Lavoto, 776 P.2d 912 (Utah 1989), in which this
court held that a "statute of limitations that is created in the same act which
establishes a new or revised definition of a crime is deemed applicable to those
crimes included in the same act unless the Legislature clearly provides otherwise.11
That case involved a statute which created a longer limitations period for the
prosecution of a crime than otherwise generally provided but the principle is the
same. The statute which establishes a new or revised definition of a crime or cause
of action and dictates the time within which it may be brought governs that crime or
cause of action. A similar case in the Utah Court of Appeals resulted in a similar
holding. In State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990), the five year limitations
period in the Utah Uniform Securities Act applied over the general four year statute
of limitations in the Utah Criminal Code. The court there stated:
In addition, we note that Utah's appellate courts have
had numerous occasions to decide, when confronted with
seemingly conflicting statutes, which should control. It has
been consistently held that specific statutes prevail over
general statutes. See, e.g., Williams v. Public Service Comm'n
of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988); Milfctt v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). Limitations periods
contained within specific statutes also control over those of
more general statutes. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984) (in action brought under
Uniform Commercial Code, Code's limitations period prevails
over that for contracts in writing generally); Floyd v. Western
Surgical Assocs., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (in
medical malpractice action, Health Care Malpractice Act
8

limitations period controls over that for fraud and mistake).
Finally, a statute of limitations included in the same act which
defines a crime applies to that crime unless otherwise clearly
provided. State v. Lavoto, 776 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1989).
On the other hand, when there is no limitations period in the statute
creating a cause of action, the general statutes of limitations, including the tolling
provisions thereof, apply. For example, Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244,245 (Utah
1980), held that the general statute of limitations was tolled by §78-12-36 because of
disability as to a wrongful death claim under §78-11-7 because "the limitations period
is neither in the statute nor the chapter creating an action for wrongful death." That
case, however, recognized the decision would be otherwise if the wrongful death
statute had its own limitation period when it stated:
In contrast, the limitation period was not tolled due to
infancy, where the wrongful death statute was construed as
creating a right of action that did not exist at common law
and thus the time restriction provided therein affected the
right of action and not merely the remedy, (at 246)
Similarly, Seelv v. Cowlev. 12 U.2d 252,365 P.2d 65 (1961), held that §78-12-35 tolled
a wrongful death action because of absence from the state.
The same principle has been applied in AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree
Development and Energy Co.. 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986), in which this Court held
that §38-1-11 of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute, which requires an action to
enforce the lien to be brought within 12 months, was jurisdictional and
limits a lienor's rights to 12 months after his work is
completed. At that point both his rights and his remedies
under the statute are extinguished, (at 292)
The court further stated, at page 291:
9

Mechanics' liens are statutory creatures unknown to the
common law. . . . compliance with the statute is required
before a party is entitled to the benefits created by the
statute.
And then quoting from D. M. Foley Co., Inc. v. North West Fed. S & L Assoc. 122
111. App.3d 411, 77 111. Dec. 877, 461 N.E.2d 500 (1984), this Court stated:
The statutory period "is not merely a statute of limitations but
a condition of liability itself and not just a limitation on the
remedy." The court held that the potential liability of
subsequent purchasers perished inchoate when plaintiffs failed
to bring suit within the period allowed after completion of the
work.
This principle was reaffirmed by this Court in Projects Unlimited. Inc. v.
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738, 751 ftn. 13 (Utah 1990), in which the
Court again stated that §38-1-11 is not a statute of limitation but rather
one of the requirements with which the claimant must comply
"before [that] party is entitled to the benefits created by the
[mechanic's lien] statute." (Quoting from AAA Fencing,
supra, at 291). . . . The commencement requirement of
section 38-1-11 serves as a substantive restriction on the lien
action and, unlike a true statute of limitation, is not waived if
not pleaded.
This footnote clarified the status of the statutory condition on the liability under the
mechanics' lien statute in the same way that the footnote in McCarthy v. Lewis.
supra, did under the trust deed statute. Neither one is a statute of limitation. Both
create a cause of action and place a definite time limit on the exercise of the
substantive right. These are conditions precedent to the bringing of the action and
necessarily mean that the general statutes of limitations, including the tolling and
renewal provisions therein, do not apply. Appellants also believe that the Court's
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failure to consider and distinguish these cases is sufficient ground to allow a rehearing
and, if necessary, further briefing to fully apprise the court of the effect of its ruling.
Otherwise, the Court's opinion in this case may cause substantial confusion as to the
effect of its prior rulings in the foregoing cases.

POINT IV
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS CLEAR, FROM THE
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES THEMSELVES, THAT
THE RENEWAL STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE
TRUST DEED STATUTE.
The fourth source from which the intended interaction of the trust deed
and renewal statutes may be gleaned, in the absence of legislative history, as stated
on page 3 of the Court's opinion, is "the language of the statutes". The Court did not
consider the language of the statutes involved in this case but only referred to
language of other statutes which it considered to more clearly state their purposes.
The language of the statutes directly involved is, of course, more relevant and is also
very clear in stating "the intended interaction of the two laws." In its codification of
the general statutes of limitations the legislature has clearly provided that those
general statutes do not apply to "specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute." The general limitations provisions are all included within
Chapter 12 of Title 78 of the Utah Code and the intent of the legislature is indicated
in the following provisions:
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
11

prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation
is prescribed by statute.
78-12-26. Within three years.
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of this
state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of
this state, except where in special cases a different limitation
is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
78-12-29. Within one year.
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture
where the action is given to an individual, or to an individual
and the state, except when the statute imposing it prescribes
a different limitation.
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
78-12-36. Effect of disability.
....

78-12-37. Effect of death.
78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits.
78-12-41. Effect of injunction or prohibition.
. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
A careful reading of these sections clearly shows that the legislature has
provided that the "special cases" of "different limitations . . . prescribed by" other
statutes shall be governed by those different limitations and not by these general
statutes of limitation. In particular, "the periods prescribed in this chapter," that is,
Chapter 12 of Title 78, which includes all of the tolling provisions of §§78-12-35
through 41, do not apply to the "specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute." §78-12-1. Thus, the tolling provision of §78-12-36 applies to
the limitation of §78-12-28, Switzer v. Reynolds, supra, because there is no different
12

limitation prescribed by the wrongful death statue, §78-11-7, and the tolling provision
of §78-12-35 also applies to the limitation of §78-12 -28, Seely v. Cowley, supra, for
the same reason. However, the tolling provision of §78-12-41 does not apply to §7814-4(1) of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., supra,
because
Chapter 12 of Title 78 of the Utah Code, dealing generally
with limitation of actions, is said to apply "except where in
special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
U.C.A., 1953, 78-12-1. (at p. 936)
Similarly, the tolling provision of §78-12-40 does not apply to §57-1-32 of
the trust deed statute because "a different limitation is prescribed by" that statute.
By the same reasoning the New Mexico renewal statute, contained in the same
chapter as the general limitations statutes and with a provision similar to §§78-12-1,
26 and 29, was held not applicable to the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act, which
was in a separate title of the code and contained its own limitation period. Perry v.
Staver, 81 N.M. 766, 473 P.2d 380, 383 (1970). The court in that case, on page 383,
quoted its prior opinion in Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 251 P.2d 274 (1952):
'There is no saving clause in the limitation provision of
the death by wrongful act statute and the courts cannot
provide a saving clause or create an exception where the
statute contains none. . . ."
The intent of the legislature is clearly stated in §§78-12-1, 26 and 29.
Where a different limitation is prescribed by other statutes, the limitations of Title
78, Chapter 12 do not apply and the tolling provisions of that same chapter also do
not apply.
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. . . separate parts of an act should not be construed in
isolation from the rest of the a c t . . . and the terms of related
code provisions should be construed in a harmonious fashion
. . . . Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467 (Utah 1989).
Thus, the renewal statute of §78-12-40 does not apply to extend the time for filing an
action under §57-1-32. The two statutes are not in conflict. The provisions of Title
78, Chapter 12 apply within Chapter 12 and other statutes outside of that chapter
which prescribe their own limitations periods operate free of the provisions of that
chapter.

CONCLUSION
The language of the statutes, their apparent purposes, this Court's prior
decisions in analogous cases and the practical consequences of the position taken by
the court dictate that the renewal statute not be applied to the trust deed statute or
to other similar statutes containing their own limitations. In addition, the court's
decision places Utah almost alone in the minority position with respect to actions of
this kind. The result of allowing the trust deed deficiency statute to stand on its own
is far from draconian, as suggested by the Court. In this case the first complaint was
dismissed for failure to serve the summons for nine months.

How is that

substantively different from failing to file the complaint within three months? In
either case the plaintiffs right to a deficiency should be barred. The effect on the
defendants is the same. Furthermore, the plaintiff chose to pursue the summary
remedy provided by the trust deed statute, depriving defendants of judicial notice,
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hearings, supervision, sale by a public officer and redemption rights. In exchange for
that privilege the plaintiff must follow the strict requirements of the trust deed statute
or it may be deprived of its right to a deficiency. It has chosen the summary remedy
for its own benefit. It must live with the consequences of any mistake in failing to
fo))ow that procedure. There is nothing draconian about that.
Appellants respectfully request a rehearing of this matter in order to
make sure that all possible aspects, and all possible consequences, of this case of first
impression are properly considered.
DATED this "Z^Vk
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
We granted appellants Thomas K. Kirkbride and Rufe
Soule permission to take an interlocutory appeal from a trial
court ruling denying their motion to dismiss an action brought
by Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Standard
Federal"). See Utah R. App. P. 5. In its complaint, Standard
Federal sought a deficiency judgment for amounts remaining
unpaid after the sale under a trust deed of property securing
a note executed by Kirkbride and Soule. Kirkbride and Soule
contend that the trial court should have dismissed the action
as barred by section 57-1-32 of the Code. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32 (1990). That section requires that any action for
a deficiency judgment be filed within three months of a
foreclosure and sale under a trust deed. X&. We reject the
contention of Kirkbride and Soule and affirm the trial court's
order denying the motion to dismiss.
Kirkbride and Soule signed and delivered to Standard
Federal a promissory note for $244,000. The note was secured
with a deed of trust covering real property in Park City,
Utah. Kirkbride and Soule later defaulted on their
obligations under the note. Standard Federal foreclosed on
the property, which was sold on March 8, 1987. Section
57-1-32 of the Code gives a creditor three months after
foreclosure and sale under a trust deed to bring an action for
a deficiency judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1990). In

accordance with that section, Standard Federal then filed an
action to recover the deficiency on June 8, 1987. [R. 44]
Because Standard Federal Jid not issue summonses to both
defendants within 120 days, as required by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(b), the trial judge granted a motion by Kirkbride
and Soule to dismiss the action without prejudice on May 2,
1988, See Utah R. Civ, P. 4(b).
On March 13, 1989, Standard Federal refiled the
action, seeking the same relief. Kirkbride and Soule moved to
dismiss the second action an the ground that the three-month
time limit within which an action for a deficiency must be
brought had passed. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, and we granted permission to appeal. See Utah R.
App. P. 5,
The facts are not in dispute. The trial court made
its ruling based on its interpretation of the law. We give no
deference to the trial court's legal determinations, but
review them for correctness. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc.
v. Dixie Power & Water. Inc., 789 P.2d 13 (Utah 1990); State
ex rel. Division of Consumer Protection vc Rio Vista Oil,
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Section 57-1-32 sets forth the remedies available to
a creditor to recover any amounts secured by a trust deed
after the property subject to the trust deed is sold. As
noted, the statute gives a creditor three months after a sale
of property under a trust deed to bring an action for any
amounts remaining unpaid. Kirkbride and Soule' argue' that this
p^o^ision establishes^an absolute statute of limitations for
rsuch ^deficiency^actfions $and that if brought after the
'three-month period, the action is barred. Kirkbride and Soule
specifically argue that Utah's Renewal Statute, section
78-12-40 of the Code, has no application to such an action.
Section 78-12-40 provides:
If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing
the same shall have expired, the plaintiff,
or if he [or she] dies and the cause of
action survives, his [or her]
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or
failure.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987). Kirkbride and Soule reason
that a general renewal statute does not apply when the
No. 900017
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specific statute authorizing the underlying action has its own
time limitation. By including an explicit time limit in the
particular statute, the legislature has implicitly rejected
application of a general extension statute such as section
78-12-40.
Counsel has not directed us to any cases dealing with
the operation of saving statutes such as section 78-12-40 in
the context of actions for trust deed deficiencies under
statutes containing their own limitation periods, nor have we
found an;y such decisions. We are unaware of any legislative
history that explains the intended interaction of the two
laws. We can, however, refer to *the language of the statutes
and to their^apparent purposes, to^our own decisions in
somewhat^analogpus 'cases'/'and *to^the~'practical consequences of
theJookftion argued by Kirbride *and<Soule.
we first consider the language and apparent purpose
of section 57-1-32. Kirkbride and Soule contend that the
language indicates a purpose to bar any action not initiated
within three months and then resolved on the merits for the
plaintiff. There is nothing in'the language of the statute
suggesting an-intent to reach such a draconian result. If
that is what the legislature intended to accomplish, it
certainly knows how to do so. For example, section 63-30-13
of the Governmental Immunity Act provides: "A claim against a
political subdivision . . . is barred unless notice of claim
is filed . . • within one year after the claim arises . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1989) (emphasis added); see Yates
v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980)
(upholding dismissal for failure to file a timely notice of
claim).
„ j0 In the absfence of such a plain^ezpxession of intent,
we havj^genejra^lly readjstatutes -that^impbse^plreconditions" to
filing* suxtv'W establishing onlyt'pirocedural^hurdles to suit,0
hurdles that can be cleared, rather than absolute bars to
suit. For example, in Yates we permitted a plaintiff to
proceed under section 78-12-40 when the initial action had
been dismissed for failure to serve a "notice of intent to
commence action" under the Utah Medical Malpractice Act,
section 78-14-8. Yates, 617 P.2d at 354; Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-8 (1987). We conclude that section 57-1-32 does not
permanently bar further proceedings anytime some procedural
failing results in the dismissal of a properly filed action.
As a fallback position, Kirkbride and Soule contend
that even if section 57-1-32 does not impose an absolute bar
by its plain terms, we should not apply section 78-12-40 to an
action brought under section 57-1-32. They reason that
78-12-40 is a general renewal statute and, as such, it may
appropriately be applied in a case asserting a common law
action or a cause of action created by a statute lacking a
3
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specific limitation period. However, they assert that where a
statute creates a cause of action and contains a specific
limitation period for that cause of action, it should be
inferred that the legislature intended to bar the application
of a general renewal statute.
We.find this-argument unpersuasive. The relevant
inquiry is"whether the legislature made plain an intention to
bar forever claims of those who are guilty of a procedural
misstep- See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988);
Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980); Foi4 -v.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). As previously noted, we
find no such indication here.
A more sensible view of the operation of the
three-month limitation period contained in section 57-1-32 is
that^ts primary, purpose .is satisfied, when^the foreclosing
g<jrJ:Y^
that* a deficiency will be
sought: "by] filing rthe. action,,' Cf . Legis. Hist. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-8 (1987) (Medical Malpractice Act's notice provision
intended to allow parties opportunity to resolve claims prior
to filing of action); Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
362, 363, 412 P.2d 449, 450 (1966) (notice requirement under
Governmental Immunity Act intended to give governmental entity
opportunity to conduct inquiry).
Prior to the enactment of specific trust deed
foreclosure statutes, the general rule was that after
foreclosing on the property securing the note, the mortgagor
could wait the period of the statute of limitations to give a
debtor notice that it would seek a deficiency judgment. gee
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 913 (1971). This delay could
leave the debtor in a state of financial uncertainty for
years. Under trust deed statutes such as section 57-1-32, the
creditor is given a speedy remedy of foreclosure and sale, but
ii} .exchange, it?must promptly put the debtor on notice as to
w h ^ h ^ ! it~ will* seek taiiy balance, due ,bykfcommencing .+an action.
Once^thisv^notrce "is -given * or the' three-month' time /pe.riod runs,
the.-debtor can* plan'accordingly:
In the present case, Kirkbride..and Saule<>wece pu.t on
notice4^within Jbhree-months oft the,date, ofr;the Asale of the
cdll'ateralTthat^adeficiency would be^sought. They managed to
have'ttiat first action dismissed on a procedural point after
the three-month period had run, but they had received notice
that their creditor intended to pursue the deficiency. When
the initial action was filed, they received all the benefit
the three-month limit conferred on them. We conclude that the
trial court properly denied the Kirkbride and Soule motion to
dismiss under section 57-1-32.
appeal.

Kirkbride and Soule raise an additional issue on
They contend that the trust deed sale was invalid
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because the sale did not comply with the requirements as set
out in the statute. Specifically, Kirkbride and Soule argue
that the notice of the trust deed sale was given prior to the
time authorized in the statute. Ss& Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-24
(1990). Because this was a violation of the statute, Standard
Federal should not receive the benefits available under the
foreclosure trust deed statute. This argument is raised for
the first time on appeal. Except in extraordinarycircumstances which are not present here, we decline to review
a matter not raised in the lower court. Drummond v. Union
Pac. R.R., 111 Utah 289, 301, 177 P.2d 903, 909 (1947).
We affirm the trial court's denial of Kirbride and
Soule's motion to dismiss.
WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Regnal W. Garff, Jr., Court of
Appeals Judge
Durham, Justice, having disqualified herself, does
not participate herein; Garff, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
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